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In discussing the threat of bioterrorism,
planning, coordination, and preparedness are
recurrent themes. State and local planning are of
particular concern to me, having served as a local
health officer and as health commissioner in
New York City during the World Trade Center
bombing. I have no doubts that the threat of
terrorism within our borders is real. And several
years later, when the sarin attack occurred in
the Tokyo subway system, it was hard not to
imagine what such an event would have meant
in the New York subway system. A fundamental
step toward addressing the threat of bioterrorism
is comprehensive planning that focuses first and
foremost on local preparedness and response
capacityintegrating the role of state, regional,
and federal governments, as well as state,
regional, and national assets. To plan effectively,
we have to think through the different types of
scenarios that may confront us, including the
announced release of a biological agent, the
silent release of a biological agent, or some kind
of hybrid event, such as having a bomb go off,
that is followed by the release of a biological or
chemical agent. In addition, we have to think
about the scenarios where person-to-person
transmission can occur or those with noncommu-
nicable infectious diseases. Bioterrorism covers a
very broad spectrum of concerns, from cata-
strophic terrorism with mass casualties, to
microevents using low technology but producing
civil unrest, disruption, disease, disabilities, and
death. All these scenarios must be considered.
We need to identify the assets and capabilities at
all different levels and identify the gaps, critical
players, policymakers, and stakeholders, and we
must forge working relationships within the
public health and health-care community as well
as with outside partners. We need to develop
shared understandings and mechanisms of
communication. All of these efforts are best
undertaken before an emergency or crisis.
We need to strengthen our nations public-
health infrastructure. This means enhancing
our surveillance and epidemiologic capacity; our
laboratory capacity to support surveillance
efforts; and our communications systems to
collect, analyze, and share data. A strong and
robust public health system requires effective
working partnerships with the medical care
community. For a host of reasons over many
years, the worlds of public health and medicine
have existed too far apart, even though they
share a common set of goals and the mission of
promoting health and preventing disease. We
need to build linkages and understanding.
We also need to make sure that the public
health community works with medical providers
to give them the kind of information they need to
respond to infectious disease threats in the
community, understand emerging disease trends,
and implement appropriate prevention and
control strategies. Improvements to health can
be achieved through more effective daily
working relationships and even through a
crisis. In addition, we have to link with other
partners beyond the public health and medical
community, particularly law enforcement and
intelligence. Through working together, we
learn to share common understanding and
language. Federal Bureau of Investigation
surveillance is different from public health
surveillance; yet, if we are going to be able to
rapidly detect, diagnose, and control a
bioterrorist event, we need to use both types of
surveillance to inform our activities and
ensure adequate preparedness.
Communication is vital. We must learn how
to educate and communicate with policymakers.
We should define policies to support our
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preparedness efforts, the true needs for new
resources, and the places in which to invest.
Legal and regulatory issues dealing with
quarantine laws and jurisdictional concerns, as
well as with the availability or use of certain
drugs or vaccines not licensed by the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration for use in certain
populations in an epidemic context, need to be
addressed.
And lastly, we must address the challenge of
informing the public and educating them about
the reality of bioterrorism. We must develop the
framework of understanding and support
required to both put in place the systems to
respond effectively in a crisis and to achieve a
level of understanding that can form the
foundation for sharing information and develop-
ing knowledge when a crisis occurs.
Hoaxes, a growing problem, offer an
opportunity to examine our coordination and
response. Thinking through the different types
of hoaxes helps us develop protocols and
strategies that lead to recognition of a true event.
Medical consequence management is an area
to be explored. The conventional bombwhere
something blows up, you come in, respond, take
care of the injured, clean up, and then return,
more or less, to life as it was beforeis not going
to be the case in a bioterrorist attack,
particularly in a scenario with human-to-human
transmission. Instead, cases will initially appear
in a scattered, sporadic manner, but rapidly
increasing and overwhelming the capacity of the
health-care system and continuing in concentric
circles of infection and disease. We cannot
address consequence management in the way
emergency plans traditionally have for earth-
quakes, fires, or bomb blasts. We need to build a
system that brings together local, state, and
national capacities in an ongoing way. We also
must recognize the need to supplement our
health-care delivery capacity with nonmedical
support that may come in the form of police,
National Guard, or possibly military support,
both to assist in the provision of services and
for crowd control and the maintenance of
order. New systems of delivering care and
treating patients will be needed. For example,
how are we going to deliver off-site care? How
are we going to ensure proper infection-control
measures in that context and provide ancillary
support services for medical care?
Another crucial aspect of effective medical
consequence management requires access to
necessary therapeutic products. We are in the
process of creating a national stockpile of drugs
and pharmaceutical products for civilian use.
Given that a bioterrorist event is low probability
and high consequence for any given locality, the
federal government can step in and provide the
leadership for creating and administering a
national stockpile.
A related concern is the need to develop new
tools for the medical management of bioterrorist
threats. The research and development agenda
needs to be addressed both through governmen-
tal efforts, including the National Institutes of
Health, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, but
also through private industry and other research
institutions. Improved and more rapid diagnos-
tic methods, new and better drugs for treatment
or prophylaxis, and new vaccines, especially
against anthrax and smallpox, are needed. In
addition to biomedical research, further research
into such diverse concerns as defining appropri-
ate personal protective gear or decontamination
procedures is fundamental to our overall
preparedness for a bioterrorist attack.
The public health and medical community
must look to the issue of prevention in terms of
how to reduce access to dangerous pathogens.
Are there strategies to prevent these often-
frightening microbes from getting into the hands
of those who might want to misuse them, and
how can we reduce the likelihood that they will
be misused? This means being concerned on an
international level about such issues as the need
to support the strengthening and enforcement of
the Biological Weapons Convention. Finally, as a
scientific community we should play a proactive
role in scientific research. We need to shape
policies against the nefarious use of biological
agents, while safeguarding legitimate research.
We need to ensure that research institutions and
individual researchers keep track of the
whereabouts of dangerous pathogens, handle
them safely, and store them securely.
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